Family Policies in the Context of Low Fertility and Social Structure. by Thomas Fent et al.
VIENNA INSTITUTE
Working Papers
Vienna Institute of Demography
Austrian Academy of Sciences






Thomas Fent, Belinda Aparicio Diaz, and Alexia Prskawetz
Family Policies in the Context




























 	   	   	  
  	 

 	  	  	 
















   	   
 ! 	  	 

 
    	 	   	














, '	 &- $ % 	
 &	 ' ' 	
 ()
*	-+	
' .- % 	

















 6	 (	 '









'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1 Introduction
Many countries of the Western world have witnessed below replacement fertility and
fertility rates falling to ever lower levels during the 1980s and 1990s. Despite the
slight increases recently observed in several countries (Myrskyl¨ a et al., 2008; Gold-
stein et al., 2009), the continuation of current fertility trends may lead to population
shrinkage and ageing in the long run. Consequently, governments are increasingly
concerned to adapt family policies targeted towards possible causes underlying these
trends. Yet, there is no broad consensus on the eﬀectivity of policies with respect to
a sustainable increase or at least stabilisation of fertility.
Assessing data from 22 industrialised countries over the period 1970-1990,
Gauthier and Hatzius (1997) ﬁnd that cash beneﬁts in the form of family allowances
are positively related to fertility. McDonald (2006), on the other hand, claims that
pronatalist policies are both expensive and ineﬀective. Investigating swedish data,
Bj¨ orklund (2006) ﬁnds that the extension of family policies from the mid-1960s
to around 1980 raised the level of fertility. Gauthier (2007), trying to generalise
empirical ﬁndings in a comprehensive survey, concludes that studies using micro
level data often ﬁnd a positive impact of parental and maternity leave schemes
on completed cohort fertility while studies using macro level data ﬁnd that family
policies inﬂuence the timing of births rather than the total number of children.
Albeit she infers that the impact tends to be small and varies highly depending on
the type of data used and on the type of policies. Using data from high–income
countries in Europe and North America, Feyrer et al. (2008) ﬁnd that a doubling of
spending is associated with an increase in the fertility rate of 0.15 children.
Many empirical studies on the eﬀectivity of family policies suﬀer from a static
concept of cause and eﬀect disregarding the indirect eﬀect of family policies ex-
erted via social inﬂuence mechanisms. Moreover, studies comparing the impact of
family policies in diﬀerent countries often ignore diﬀerences in the societal struc-
ture in the countries under consideration. This is surprising since the literature on
fertility has identiﬁed social networks as a key mechanism explaining fertility in-
tentions. Kohler et al. (2002) indicate demographic distortions of period fertility
2measures, economic and social changes, social interaction processes, institutional
changes, and postponement-quantum interactions as the main causes of low fertility
in Europe. Social interactions like personal communication about fertility intentions
or perceived social norms and social pressure may inﬂuence childbearing decisions
(Bernardi, 2003; Fernandez and Fogli, 2006). Moreover, social networks may not
only inﬂuence individual childbearing preferences but also individual feasibility of
realising these preferences due to the provision of resources like informal childcare,
emotional assistance, and material support (B¨ uhler and Philipov, 2005; Philipov
et al., 2006).
With this contribution we aim to resolve the confusion and disagreement about
the eﬀectivity of family policies by explicitly adressing their twofold impact. We
integrate the role of social structure in a model of fertility decisions and investigate
whether and to what extent the eﬀectivity of family policies will change under such
a framework. More speciﬁcally, family policies may have a direct and an indirect
eﬀect on fertility. The direct eﬀect easens the burden of having children for instance
by providing institutional childcare or ﬁnancial beneﬁts and allows parents to fulﬁll
their intended fertility. The indirect eﬀect of family policies rests on the assumption
that many people imitate or consult their friends, siblings, or parents in choosing
their intended fertility. Hence, any additional birth resulting from family policies
may cause an increase of fertility intentions within the involved peer group. Policies
causing a modest eﬀect on fertility at the individual level may have a large impact
at the macro level due to such peer eﬀects (Feyrer et al., 2008).
Family policies can aﬀect fertility through their inﬂuence on the costs of chil-
dren, on individuals’ income, and on preferences. Most governments nowadays refrain
from universal cash beneﬁts and rather aim to reduce the structural barriers of com-
bining work and childcare. Individuals diﬀer in their needs, tastes, and objectives
but public policy makers face the challenge to establish a uniform set of policies
to serve a heterogeneous population. Neither the micro nor the macro level alone
may explain the inﬂuence of family policies (imposed on the macro level) on indi-
vidual childbearing decisions (taken at the micro level) and the resulting period and
cohort fertility patterns (observed on the macro level) to its full extent. Modelling
the impact of family policies on fertility decisions requires to include the decision
mechanism at the micro level, the society at the macro level, the interaction between
the micro and macro level, and the interaction among individuals within their peer
groups.
Therefore, we apply an agent based model (ABM) to evaluate the impact
of alternative family policies on fertility in the context of social and institutional
structures which diﬀer across countries. ABMs oﬀer the opportunity to capture
individual heterogeneity with respect to several characteristics and allow us to test
hypotheses regarding fertility behaviour in the context of diﬀerent cultures and
diﬀerent types of family policies. While the focus is on the aggregate level (completed
fertility), our model is based on the micro level and explains how aggregate level
properties emerge from the behaviour of the agents on the micro level. As the recent
literature argues for social interaction as a key factor in shaping fertility decisions and
preferences, we explicitly account for peer group eﬀects in our model. Recently ABMs
3have been applied in demography to explain mate choice and marriage bevaviour
(Simao and Todd, 2003; Todd and Billari, 2003; Todd et al., 2005; Billari et al.,
2007), fertility rates (Aparicio Diaz et al., 2007), and migration patterns. Baroni
et al. (2009) apply ABMs to investigate the role of family policies in Sweden.
The paper is organised as follows. In section two we present the model struc-
ture, in section three we illustrate the numerical ﬁndings, and section four concludes.
2 The model
In this section we develop an agent based computational model to investigate how
the social structure inﬂuences the eﬀectivity of family policies. In particular we study
the impact of ﬁxed and income dependent family allowances on individual fertility
decisions and the resulting cohort fertility, intended fertility, and fertility gap (the
diﬀerence between intended fertility and actual fertility) on the aggregate level.
We consider a one–sex model containing only female agents. The crucial features
of our agent based simulation model are the agents’ heterogeneity with respect
to age, income, parity, and intended fertility, the social network which links the
agents to a small subset of the population and the inﬂuence mechanism acting via
that network.1 The explicit modelling of the social network and social inﬂuence
mechanims provides the opportunity to capture the direct and the indirect eﬀect
of family policies. Although we refer to Austrian data to calibrate our model, our
framework and focus is more general. Our aim is to get general insights into the
impact of family policies on fertility under diﬀerent assumptions regarding the social
structure of a society rather than accurately predicting the increase of fertility due
to a certain set of policy measures.
2.1 Initial population
At time t each agent i is characterised by her age xi,t, household income wi,t, parity
pi,t, the number of her dependent children (who do not yet have their own income)
ni,t, and her intended fertility fi,t. We use Austrian census data to obtain an initial
age and parity distribution. The parity distribution and the distribution of the age
of the children is based on Austrian data on age at birth in 20082. Moreover, we
apply data from the Austrian income tax statistics3 for the distribution of household
income. We use age–speciﬁc data on the 25% quantile, the median value, and the 75%
quantile of the annual net income and interpolate the data. Agents get assigned a
value zi determining the quantile in the age speciﬁc income distribution they belong
1We are aware that other characteristics like for instance education also have an impact on
childbearing behaviour. However, we refrain from including additional characteristics since this
would come at the cost of additional model complexity without gaining any further insights with
respect to the impact of the social structure on the eﬀectivity of family policies. Moreover, education
is highly correlated with income. Therefore, if we include both, income and education, it will be
diﬃcult to disentangle the impact of the two.
2STATISTIK AUSTRIA, Statistik der nat¨ urlichen Bev¨ olkerungsbewegung 2008
3STATISTIK AUSTRIA, Allgemeiner Einkommensbericht 2008
4to. Due to simplicity we assume that agents remain in the same quantile during their
entire life but progress to higher income levels as they age. Then we use data from
the Austrian Gender and Generation Survey (GGS) to estimate the distribution of
the desire for additional children given the agents age and parity. We deﬁne the
probability πm
i that agent i wants at least m additional children (1 ≤ m ≤ 8) and







1 xi + β
m
2 pi (1)
for each m to estimate the according probabilities from the GGS data for our initial
population.
2.2 Simulation steps





and the consumption level of ni,t dependent children is deﬁned as4
c
(ni,t)
i,t = ni,t τ
√
wi,t.
Therefore, the disposable income yi,t—the diﬀerence between household income wi,t
and expenditures for consumption—becomes
yi,t = wi,t − ci,t − c
(ni,t)
i,t .
If the intended fertility exceeds the actual parity,
fi,t >p i,t, (2)






wi,t ≥ σ +( ni,t +1 ) τ, (3)
the agent is exposed to the biological probability (fecundity) of having another
child (Leridon, 2004, 2008). In case of a successful live birth a new agent is generated
with a probability depending on the Austrian sex ratio at birth since our simulation
only keeps track of female individuals. This new agent k with age xk,t = 0 is mutually
linked to her mother and her sisters (see subsection 2.4). Male children are not
implemented as agents within the artiﬁcial population but they contribute to the
parity and the number of dependent children of their mother.
Each time step each agent ages by one year, xi,t+1 = xi,t + 1 and, therefore,
children will eventually turn adults earning their own income. The probability of
this transition depends on the agents age and is based on age speciﬁc labour force
4We do not model the quantity–quality trade–oﬀ of children explicity but we assume that the
spendings for children increase with household income.
5participation rates observed in Austria in 20085. After the child’s transition to adult-
hood the number of dependent children of her mother is reduced by one but leaving
her mothers parity unchanged. Moreover, the new adult agent gets assigned her own
income level zi determining her household income wi,t = wi,t(zi,x i,t), her own social
network (see subsection 2.4), and her own fertility intentions. Thereafter she starts
to evaluate her fertility intentions according to the inequalities (2) and (3). Finally,
agents die oﬀ with a probability according to the Austrian female life table.
Since the distribution of fertility preferences in the artiﬁcial society may have
changed since the initialisation, we compute for each m the aggregate share of adult
agents with parity pi <mwho desire at least m children, Πm
t . We use these shares
to update the parameters βm




























2.3 Impact of family policies
We investigate two alternative types of family policies. The policy maker may provide
a ﬁxed amount bf per child to each household or a beneﬁt proportional to the
household income wi,t
6. A ﬁxed child support partially covers the consumption level










and the disposable income can be expressed as









The necessary condition for having an additional child becomes
√


















5STATISTIK AUSTRIA, Mikrozensus-Arbeitskr¨ afteerhebung 2008
6Although in our mathematical notation family policies appear as cash beneﬁts, this approach
is perfectly capable to capture non–monetary family policies in terms of their monetary equiva-
lent. For instance publicly subsidised childcare is equivalent to an income dependent policy since
households with higher income gain more.
6and the disposable income can be expressed as









resulting in the necessary condition for having an additional child
√







Finally, if the policy maker opts for a policy mix combining ﬁxed and income de-
pendent cash beneﬁts, the necessary condition is
√










This inequality embraces the direct eﬀect of family policies, i.e. the alleviation of
the budget contraints enabling parents to realise their fertility intentions.
2.4 Endogenous social network
The agents are closely linked to a set of other agents with whom they communicate
about their fertility intentions and realisations. We refer to this group as an agent’s
social network or peer group. The similarity of agents’ characteristics has an impact
on the probability of being chosen into an agents social network. Moreover, we
assume a certain degree of network transitivity or clustering, i.e. the tendency that
two agents who are connected to a third party establish a mutual relationship over
time (the friends of my friends are also my friends). We consider age, income, and
intended fertility as those characteristics determining an agent’s social background
and compute the social distance between agents i and j,
dij = |xi − xj| +  |zi − zj| +  2 |fi − fj|. (4)
The parameter   determines the weight of the income diﬀerence and  2 determines
the weight of the diﬀerences in intended fertility of the two agents. Diﬀerences in
income or intended fertility are ignored when setting the respective parameter 0. To
build up the social network an agent chooses a distance d with probability
pr1(d)=cexp(−αd) (5)
and then picks an agent with distance d as a new friend. For this choice we deﬁne
another probability pr2 determining whether this new friend is chosen among those
individuals who are not linked to any of the agents peers or only among those
individuals who are linked to at least one of the agents friends. This parameter
allows us to adjust the degree of transitivity in the social network. The constant c is
a normalisation parameter to make sure that the probabilities of all feasible distances
sum up to one and the parameter α determines the agent’s level of homophily. If α is
assigned high values, the chance of a connection between similar individuals becomes
high. The selecting agent is also added to the network of the selected agent. Thus,
we assume a mutual friendship relation which means that the underlying network
topology is represented by an undirected graph. This procedure is repeated until
the desired number of peers, s, is found. This desired network size is drawn from
a log—normal distribution (see for instance Dunbar and Spoors, 1995, Fig. 1) with
mean ¯ s and rounded to the nearest integer.
72.5 Social inﬂuence and intended fertility
At each time t each agent i has an intended fertility fi,t, deﬁned as the sum of
current parity pi,t and the intended additional children, which must be integer and
nonnegative. The intended fertility may be altered due to social inﬂuence imposed
by the peer group. To model the social inﬂuence on fertility intentions we adapt an
approach suggested by Goldenberg et al. (2007). We assume that with probability
pr3 (pr4) intended fertility increases (decreases) by one due to the social inﬂuence





i ), the number of agents j who are linked to i and have a parity
greater (less) than the intended fertility of agent i, i.e. pj,t >f i,t (pj,t <f i,t). Based
on these calculations we compute the probabilities for an agent to be positively or
negatively inﬂuenced by at least one agent from the peer group7,
p
+





i,t =1 − (1 − pr4)
π−
i .
Individuals may be exposed to positive inﬂuence, negative inﬂuence, both positive
and negative inﬂuence, or neither. Hence, the probability of being only positively








i,t) and the prob-




i,t. We use the parameter γ
(1−γ) to determine the fraction of individuals who increase (decrease) their intended
fertility in case of mixed inﬂuence. Then, the probabilities to increase, decrease, or
keep the intended fertility constant are























These adaptations of individual fertility intentions capture the indirect eﬀect of
family policies. Parents who have additional children because of the direct eﬀect
described before may, subsequently, exert a social inﬂuence on their peers resulting
in an increase of their fertility intentions.
While in the marketing literature adopting a certain product may inﬂuence
friends to adopt this product as well, in our model actual births are assumed to
inﬂuence fertility intentions which need not to be realised immediately. Thus, we
allow for diﬀerent probabilities for the increase and decrease since the actual parity
within the network is usually lower than the desired fertility of the peers. Using the
same probability for increase and decrease results in a steady bias towards lower
levels of intended fertility.
7If pr3 is the probability of increasing intended fertility due to meeting one peer with higher
parity, then (1 − pr3) is the probability of not increasing intended fertility despite this one peer,
(1 − pr3)π
+
i is the probability of not increasing intended fertility despite π
+
i peers with higher
parity, and 1 − (1 − pr3)π
+
i is the probability of increasing intended fertility when being exposed
to π
+
i peers with higher parity.
83 Simulation Results
To explore the simulation model described in the previous section we generate an
initial population of agents endowed with the characteristics age, parity, number of
dependent children, intended fertility, and income based on Austrian data. Next, we
run the simulation model for 100 time steps (years) with a ﬁxed set of parameters
and observe completed cohort fertility, intended fertility, and the fertility gap (the
diﬀerence between intended and completed cohort fertility) on the aggregate level.
Afterwards we generate another initial population and run the simulation again with
a diﬀerent set of parameters. Since we are interested in the role of social structure
with regard to the impact of family policies we vary the level of ﬁxed and income
dependent family allowances bf and bv, homophily α, the degree of network transi-
tivity pr2, the weight of income  2, and the strength of positive and negative social
inﬂuence pr3 and pr4. In particular we use   =1 ,τ =2 .3, σ =2 .5, γ =0 .7,
α =0 .2:0 .4:1 .08,  2 =0:3:3 ,bf =0:0 .2:2 .0, bv =0:0 .04 : 0.28,
pr2 =0 .1:0 .3:0 .7, pr3 =0 .16 : 0.02 : 0.22, and pr3 − pr4 = −0.06 : 0.02 : 0.06
which can be interpreted as applying 88 diﬀerent sets of family policies (determined
by the parameters bf and bv) on 3780 diﬀerent societies (represented by α,  2, pr2,
pr3,a n dpr3−pr4). To reduce the impact of randomness we repeat the simulations for
each parameter set several times resulting in a total of about 1.4 million simulations.
In this section we summarise the results obtained from these simulations.
Since actual fertility depends on the realisation of fertility intentions we in-
vestigate the two components intended fertility and fertility gap independently. The
fertility gap allows us to measure the direct eﬀect of family policies and the com-
parison of fertility intentions resulting from diﬀerent policies allows us to measure
the indirect eﬀect. Figure 1 depicts completed cohort fertility, intended fertility, and
the fertility gap of those birth cohorts ﬁnishing their reproductive period during the
last ten years of the simulation versus ﬁxed (graphs in the left column) and income
dependent (graphs in the right column) child supports. Here and in the following
ﬁgures the solid red line always represents the average over all simulations and the
grey shaded area indicates the range capturing the outcome of 95% of the simula-
tions. In the left column dashed, dotted, and dotdashed lines in black, green, and
blue show the averages over all simulations with the same level of income dependent
family allowances (bv) and in the right column they depict the average over all sim-
ulations with the same level of ﬁxed family allowances (bf). Both, ﬁxed and income
dependent family allowances appear to have a positive inﬂuence on cohort fertility,
a small positive impact on intended fertility and a negative impact on the fertility
gap. Since the impact of family policies on the fertility gap appears more pronounced
than the impact on intended fertility we may conclude that in our simulation model
and for the speciﬁc parameter range the direct eﬀect of family policies is stronger
than the indirect eﬀect.
Although these graphs motivate conclusions regarding the impact of family
policies on fertility it is not clear whether this is just a delusion resulting from
8This means the parameter α is varied from 0.2 to 1.0 by increments of 0.4


















































































































Figure 1: Completed cohort fertility, intended fertility, and fertility gap by ﬁxed, bf,
and income dependent, bv, family allowances. Both types of family allowances have
a positive impact on cohort fertility and intended fertility and a negative impact on
the fertility gap.
10averaging over many simulation runs. Therefore we present statistical estimates on
the impact of child supports in table 1. The dependent variables are completed cohort
fertility (ctfr), intended fertility (f), and the fertility gap (gap) and the explanatory
variables are public spending in ﬁxed family allowances (spendingbf) and income
dependent family allowances (spendingbv) measured in monetary units per child per




.1887161*** .0706443*** -.1180716*** spendingbf
(.0011947) (.0018359) (.000757)
.0658147*** .0309704*** -.0348443*** spendingbv
(.0001891) (.0002906) (.0001198)
Adjusted R2 0.0874 0.0084 0.0663
Table 1: Estimation of the impact of ﬁxed, spendingbf, and income dependent,
spendingbv, family allowances on completed cohort fertility, intended fertility, and
the fertility gap, standard errors in parentheses, * signiﬁcant at 10 percent; ** sig-
niﬁcant at 5 percent; *** signiﬁcant at 1 percent.
positive impact on cohort fertility and intended fertility and a signiﬁcant negative
impact on the fertility gap. Fixed family allowances show a stronger impact. The
coeﬃcient for spendingbf explaining chohort fertility, .1887161, can be interpreted
such that increasing public investments in children by 1000 Euro per child and
year would increase cohort fertility by about 0.19. However, this result should be
interpreted with caution since our model is not calibrated to allow for such accurate
quantiﬁcations.
Figures 2 to 5 again depict cohort fertility, intended fertility and the fertility
gap versus ﬁxed an income dependent family allowances. In the left (right) column
dashed, dotted, and dotdashed lines represent the averages over simulations with
the same level of income dependent family allowances, bv (ﬁxed family allowances,
bf). The colours (black, blue, and green) indicate diﬀerent combinations of family
allowances and agents’ homophily (ﬁgure 2), weight of intended fertility in choos-
ing the social network (ﬁgure 3), network transitivity (ﬁgure 4), and the diﬀerence
between the probabilities of being inﬂuenced by peers with higher or lower parity
(ﬁgure 5). The graphs reveal that homophily α, the weight  2, and transitivity pr2
have a visible but small impact on fertility but the diﬀerence pr3 − pr4 has a pro-
nounced positive impact on completed cohort fertility and on the fertility gap and
an extremely strong positive impact on intended fertility which actually exceeds
the impact of the policy mix. Thus, the inﬂuence mechanism determined by the
parameters pr3 and pr4 can drastically alter the indirect eﬀect of family policies.
Figure 6 depicts cohort fertility, intended fertility and the fertility gap versus
the diﬀerence pr3 − pr4. In the left (right) column the dashed, dotted, and dot-
dashed lines in black, green, and blue represent the averages over all simulations
with the same level of income dependent (ﬁxed) family allowances. These graphs
again illustrate the strong positive impact of the diﬀerence pr3 − pr4 on the three
























































































































Figure 2: Completed cohort fertility, intended fertility, and fertility gap by ﬁxed, bf,
and income dependent, bv, family allowances and by homphily α. Homophily appears
to have a positive impact on completed cohort fertility and intended fertility. The
overall impact of homphily is small compared to the impact of the policy mix.










































































































































Figure 3: Completed cohort fertility, intended fertility, and fertility gap by ﬁxed, bf,
and income dependent, bv, family allowances and  2, the weight of intended fertility.
The weight of intended fertility shows no clear–cut inﬂuence.










































































































































Figure 4: Completed cohort fertility, intended fertility, and fertility gap by ﬁxed,
bf, and income dependent, bv, family allowances and by network transitivity pr2.
Transitivity shows no clear–cut inﬂuence.




























































































































































Figure 5: Completed cohort fertility, intended fertility, and fertility gap by ﬁxed,
bf, and income dependent, bv, family allowances and pr3 − pr4, the diﬀerence be-
tween the probabilities of positive and negative social inﬂuence. The diﬀerence has
a strong positive impact on completed cohort fertility and on the fertility gap and
an extremely strong positive impact on intended fertility which actually exceeds the
impact of the policy mix.
15fertility measures. Moreover, the graphs in the second row show that pr3 − pr4 has
a strong impact on the indirect eﬀect of family policies exceeding the impact of the
policy mix (because the range of intended fertility captured by each of the curves
is bigger than the gap between the curves). The graph in the left panel of the third
row shows that the impact of income dependent family allowances on the direct
eﬀect is stronger than the impact of pr3 − pr4 (because the gap between the curves
is bigger than the range captured by each curve). The graph in the right panel of
the third row shows that the impacts of ﬁxed family allowances and pr3 − pr4 on
the direct eﬀect are approximately equal. Finally, all six graphs in this ﬁgure reveal
a nonlinear impact of pr3 − pr4. We will consider this nonlinearity in the following
statistical investigation.
In table 2 we present statistical estimates on the impact of child sup-
ports on fertility controlling for network parameters and for the social inﬂuence.
Again, the dependent variables are completed cohort fertility (ctfr), intended fer-
tility (f), and the fertility gap (gap). The explanatory variables are spendingbf,
spendingbv, α, pr2,  2, pr3,a n dpr3 − pr4. Moreover, we include interaction
terms α*spendingbf, α*spendingbv, pr2*spendingbf, pr2*spendingbv,  2*spendingbf,
 2*spendingbv, (pr3−pr4)*spendingbf, and (pr3−pr4)*spendingbv and the quadratic
term (pr3 − pr4)2. Like in the previous estimation spendingbf and spendingbv have
a signiﬁcant positive impact on cohort fertility and intended fertility and a signiﬁ-
cant negative impact on the fertility gap. Fixed family allowances contribute more
to the direct eﬀect while for income dependent family allowances the direct and
indirect eﬀect are nearly equal. Homophily α has a signiﬁcant positive impact on
cohort fertility and intended fertility but no signiﬁcant impact on the fertility gap.
Thus, homophily operates mostly on the indirect eﬀect. Looking at α*spendingbf and
α*spendingbv reveals that the interaction of homophily with ﬁxed family allowances
is weakly signiﬁcant, but the interaction of homophily with income dependent family
allowances has a strong negative impact on cohort fertility, intended fertility, and on
the fertility gap. This means, that societies characterised by a high level of homophily
tend to higher levels of fertility but the role of (income dependent) policies is weaker
in such societies. Network transitivity, pr2, does not show a signiﬁcant impact on any
of the dependent variables and the interaction with policies is not signiﬁcant either.
The weight of income for calculating the social distance in equation (4),  2, has a
small but strongly signiﬁcant positive impact on all three fertility measures. Thus,
an increase in  2 raises cohort fertility and intended fertility. However, the gain in
intended fertility cannot be fully realised and the gap between intended and realised
fertility grows. The interactions with policies, on the other hand, mitigate that ef-
fect. All coeﬃcients have a negative sign and the negative impact of  2*spendingbv is
even stronlgy signiﬁcant. As expected, the probability of being positively inﬂuenced
by a peer with higher parity, pr3, has a positive impact on intended fertility. More-
over, the impact on the fertility gap is signiﬁcant and negative resulting in an even
stronger positive and signiﬁcant impact on cohort fertility. The diﬀerence between
the probabilities of being inﬂuenced by peers with higher or lower parity, (pr3−pr4),
has a strong positive impact on intended fertility and cohort fertility but also on
the fertility gap. Thus, the increased intentions cannot always be met due to the
budgetary contraint in our model, mitigating the positive impact on cohort fertility





























































































































































Figure 6: Completed cohort fertility, intended fertility, and fertility gap by pr3−pr4,
the diﬀerence between the probabilities of positive and negative social inﬂuence
and by ﬁxed, bf, and income dependent, bv, family allowances. The diﬀerence has
a strong positive impact on completed cohort fertility and on the fertility gap and
an extremely strong positive impact on intended fertility which actually exceeds the




.1940409*** .0775591*** -.1164696*** spendingbf
(.0031738) (.0049272) (.0019982)
.0735332*** .0395204*** -.034013*** spendingbv
(.0005052) (.0007843) (.0003181)
.1243855*** .129437*** .0050632 α
(.0059623) (.0092561) (.0037537)
-.00779** -.0117448* -.0039536 α*spendingbf
(.0038786) (.0060213) (.0024419)
-.0167206*** -.0204917*** -.0037716*** α*spendingbv
(.0006116) (.0009494) (.000385)
-.0031182 -.0032567 -.0000995 pr2 (.0072165) (.0112033) (.0045434)
-.0004732 .0015489 .0019932 pr2*spendingbf
(.0046968) (.0072916) (.002957)
.0002016 .000318 .000117 pr2*spendingbv
(.000744) (.0011551) (.0004684)
.0051561*** .0095546*** .0043964***  2 (.0012934) (.0020079) (.0008143)
-.0008183 -.0018387 -.0010213*  2*spendingbf
(.0008428) (.0013084) (.0005306)
-.0010723*** -.0014866*** -.0004143***  2*spendingbv
(.000133) (.0002065) (.0000838)
1.997349*** .2329939*** -1.764388*** pr3 (.0112089) (.0174013) (.0070569)
4.260431*** 9.486284*** 5.226278*** pr3 − pr4 (.0516277) (.0801495) (.0325037)
20.89095*** 32.61836*** 11.7265*** (pr3 − pr4)2
(.585272) (.9086058) (.3684751)
.4146195*** .0772179 -.3374474*** (pr3 − pr4)*spendingbf
(.0334119) (.0518703) (.0210354)
-.0200548*** -.2432559*** -.2232603*** (pr3 − pr4)*spendingbv
(.0053607) (.0083222) (.003375)
Adjusted R2 0.1436 0.0504 0.1350
Table 2: Estimation of the impact of family allowances and parameters determining
the social structure on completed cohort fertility, intended fertility, and the fertility
gap, standard errors in parentheses, * signiﬁcant at 10 percent; ** signiﬁcant at 5
percent; *** signiﬁcant at 1 percent.
18compared to intended fertility. The quadratic term (pr3 − pr4)2 has an even stronger
positive impact on the three dependent variables, conﬁrming the results depicted in
ﬁgure 6. The interaction (pr3 − pr4)*spendingbf has a signiﬁcant positive impact on
completed cohort fertility, no signiﬁcant impact on intended fertility and a signiﬁ-
cant negative impact on the fertility gap. Thus, the diﬀerence (pr3 − pr4) supports
the direct eﬀect of ﬁxed family allowances resulting in higher cohort fertility. The
interaction with income dependent family allowances, (pr3 − pr4)*spendingbv, has
a signiﬁcant negative impact on cohort fertility, intended fertility, and on the fer-
tility gap. Hence, the diﬀerence (pr3 − pr4) strengthens the direct eﬀect of income
dependent family allowances but weakens its indirect eﬀect resulting in a negative
impact on cohort fertility.
4 Summary and conclusions
We study the impact of ﬁxed and income dependent family allowances on intended
fertility, on the realisation of intended fertility and on the resulting completed cohort
fertility. In particular we investigate whether the structure of a society represented
by parameters specifying the social network and the social inﬂuence mechanism has
the potential to alter the role of family policies. In our modelling framework indi-
viduals are characterised by their sociodemographic characteristics age, household
income, parity, the number of dependent children, and intended fertility. The agents
are closely linked to a set of other agents with whom they communicate about
their fertility intentions and realisations. We refer to this group as an agent’s social
network. The whole agent population constitutes the society. The agents are not
directly linked to those agents who do not belong to their social network but any
agent may somehow indirectly inﬂuence any other agent via intermediaries. The
above mentioned characteristics as well as family policy measures and the social
inﬂuence exerted by the social network have an impact on the agent’s fertility inten-
tions and behaviour. The model allows us to carry out experiments to test various
combinations of childcare beneﬁts and combine them with diﬀerent assumptions
regarding the underlying social structure.
Our simulations reveal a positive impact of both ﬁxed and income dependent
family allowances on completed cohort fertiliy and on intended fertility and a neg-
ative impact of ﬁxed and income dependent child supports on the fertility gap.
However, several network and social inﬂuence parameters have the ability not only
to inﬂuence fertility itself but also to inﬂuence the eﬀectivity of family policies, often
in a detrimental way. For instance, while a higher degree of homophily among the
network partners has a positive eﬀect on fertility (intentions and realisations), family
policies may be less eﬀective in such a society. A similar result holds for the parame-
ter that characterises the weight put on income in the selection of the social network
and the parameter that determines the social inﬂuence on intended fertility among
network partners. Therefore, policymakers aiming to transfer a certain policy mix
that has proved successful from one country to another one ignoring diﬀerences in
the social structure may fail. Family policies can only be successful if they explicitly
19take into account the characteristics of the society they are assigned for.
We further conclude that empirical cross-country comparisons of diﬀerent types
of family policies need to be interpreted with caution for two reasons. Firstly, the em-
pirical impact of a certain policy depends on the subset of policies being investigated
and comprehensive experiments taking into consideration any possible policy mix
are not feasible in the real world. Secondly, many empirical studies do not account
for diﬀerences in the social structure in the countries under consideration.
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